Author of article for the SEnECA Blog: Dr. Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Head of the New Silk Road Program at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often perceived as competing with the European Union’s (EU) approach to connectivity. This is largely because China’s model of infrastructure lending and foreign engagement does not include the political values component emphasized by the EU. Poorly governed and non-transparent projects can still receive support if they fit within BRI narratives. China’s motives for infrastructure lending are often criticized as attempts to expand political and security influence—particularly in neighboring Central Asia—where good governance is not a prerequisite.
However, beyond the logic of politics and security, there is an investment logic within the BRI that becomes vulnerable in cases of poor governance. As long as investment returns are not directly at odds with China’s “national interests,” Beijing has little incentive to undermine actors promoting a more favorable investment environment. This creates an opportunity for the EU to engage with and influence Chinese activities in Central Asia.
To seize this opportunity, the EU should emphasize that good governance in Central Asia is also in China’s interest, as it enhances the likelihood of successful investment outcomes. According to D. Dollar (2019), the People’s Bank of China “provided $50 million to the International Monetary Fund as a grant to train officials from Belt and Road countries in debt sustainability analysis.” This indicates that, when it comes to credit management, China is willing to learn from the West—since future debt write-offs or acquisition of low-liquidity assets would reflect poorly on the Chinese government domestically. Consequently, China is unlikely to oppose EU investment in promoting good governance across Central Asia. That said, this argument does not necessarily imply China’s interest in combating corruption, as a certain level of corruption, while detrimental to society, may not directly threaten the security of its investments.
There is a clear opportunity for the EU to promote more effective and accountable governance in Central Asia by persuading China that European expertise in institutional development benefits not only Central Asian societies but also improves China’s long-term investment returns and, ultimately, enhances Eurasian connectivity. The EU can provide such expertise through existing mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation Instrument (RCI), which supports the rule of law and good governance in Central Asia. These programs could be expanded to cover all BRI project sectors—from legal support during contract negotiations to cost assessment and institutional oversight. To avoid a sharp reaction from China, EU member states participating in the BRI could be involved in this process. Given rising concerns in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over growing external debt to China, Central Asian states would likely welcome EU expertise in these areas.
However, there is one challenge. The security of China’s western border is often cited as another key motivation for Beijing’s engagement in Central Asia. This is evident in Chinese military exercises in Kyrgyzstan and reports of Chinese military facilities in Tajikistan. If the security logic becomes the dominant rationale for China’s presence in the region, the investment logic—and thus the need for good governance—will likely become secondary.
In conclusion, the EU’s primary motivation for engagement in Central Asia is to strengthen Eurasian connectivity, build closer ties with a historically under-engaged region, and create a more favorable environment for European investors and smoother trade transit. China’s motivation, by contrast, is more strategic—focused on security cooperation and investment protection. Nevertheless, common ground can be found in promoting good governance and financial responsibility. China is likely to support EU engagement in Central Asia as a means to ensure the smooth functioning of the BRI. The EU, in turn, can benefit from China’s investment in regional infrastructure—since, with proper management, the BRI can contribute significantly to Eurasian connectivity. Now, as participating countries begin to recognize the risks associated with the BRI, it is the right moment for a proactive EU.
Official project website: https://www.seneca-eu.net
This project is funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 770256.
